The October 21 agreement between India and China focusing on disengagement and the resumption of pre-2020 patrolling patterns in the flashpoint areas of Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh is indeed a welcome development. The agreement marks a major milestone in the disengagement process between the two nations. The agreement takes care of much of the border dispute that started in the summer of 2020, but not all of it. While any border deal with China is good, “any deal” with China also harbors the danger of creating undesirable fait accomplis and feeds Beijing’s habit of nibbling away at Indian territory.
Last year’s October deal is largely viewed as a temporary reprieve in the relationship between the two neighbours, rather than a restoration of the status quo ante bellum that existed before the 2020 border standoff. It is an imperfect deal, in that sense. But that doesn’t take away from the fact that we needed this temporary breather, as getting bogged down with China on the border is not in our strategic interest. If this agreement is indeed a temporary reprieve, we can expect to see more skirmishes and standoffs, coupled with a persistent reluctance from China to engage in a negotiated settlement of the border dispute with India. This is purely a function of growing Chinese power, how it sees itself and sees India compared to itself: China, to paraphrase Thucydides, seeks to do what it can and expects India to suffer what it must.
Looking at the October deal from a long-term perspective is also important. From a grand strategic perspective, China is India’s most consequential challenge for various reasons. Consider the following. China today refuses to acknowledge India as an equal, particularly as the power asymmetry between the two nations has intensified over the years. This massive power imbalance has decisively disrupted the regional balance of power. China also harbors territorial ambitions towards India, further worsening the complexities of their relationship. If we put these factors together, they highlight a critical and unavoidable reality: India’s China problem is not going away anytime soon; China will continue to be a profound grand strategic issue for us. If we think temporary breathers will take care of the China challenge, we are being incurably delusional.
The factors discussed here can lead our policymakers and strategic thinkers to three potential conclusions. One, it is important to balance China even as it is already too late. India, such a conclusion would argue, must engage in a series of acts to externally and internally balance rising Chinese power. Internal balancing would involve carrying out major national security and military reforms to meet the China challenge over time. External balancing would involve finding partners and coalitions that can help India balance the China challenge. It is clear today to Indian strategists that India’s ability to balance China on its own is progressively declining and it needs new partners to do so.
That said, the external balancing of China must carefully engage in finding the right kind of partners, ensuring partnerships don’t lead to undesirable expectations, carefully adjusting our policies for maximum impact, and avoiding commitments that could lead to unacceptable outcomes. The United States (US) tops the country’s list of potential external balancers for China, but utilizing American power to balance China in the region has its own risks. Balancing Chinese attempts to dominate the region using the American desire to contain China’s global ambitions without creating an over-reliance on US support or pitting Beijing against India will be a delicate task.
The second conclusion our strategic thinkers could reach is that India should live with China’s overwhelming power in the region. The logic behind such a conclusion is rather straightforward: India doesn’t have the material power to balance China, balancing China could provoke more confrontations on the border or elsewhere, China is important as a trading partner, and using external powers to balance China could. produce unintended results. Learning to live with China’s dominance of the region would involve accepting India’s secondary power status in South Asia, increasing Chinese naval dominance of the Indian Ocean, and being careful not to get on China’s wrong side.
The third conclusion is a mix of the first two conclusions: Waiting for the country’s power to grow, bidding one’s time, hoping China doesn’t act out in the meanwhile, depend on trade to soothe bilateral tensions, looking for partners to indirectly balance China. , among others.
Among these three potential choices, what exactly is likely to be India’s preferred choice going forward? Are we leaning towards living with a China-dominated region with limited internal and external balancing and without a grand strategic approach to dealing with a rising and aggressive superpower? Or are we actively looking for ways, means, and partners to balance China?
Making a choice is a grand strategic matter for India today and in the future. Whichever choice we make, our future policies, strategies, and tactics will be determined by that choice — and choices will have consequences.
Let’s keep in mind that the history of balancing behavior among States shows that weaker powers always have access to a range of strategies to balance a stronger adversary. The gravest mistake a weaker power seeking to avoid subservience to a stronger power can make is to accept a balance of power that is heavily skewed against it. The question remains: Will we repeat that mistake?
Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU and is editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
