India is quietly stepping up its maritime engine with Africa. Earlier this month, the Indian navy launched a new multile exercise-the Africa-India maritime engine (Aikeyme)-off the coast of tanzania, Involving Navies from 10 African Country. Around the same time, Ins Sunayna-Designated the Indian Ocean Ship (iOS) Sagar-Set Sail on a month-told deployment through the Western Indian Ocean, Carrying A Mixed Crew of Indian and AFICANNEL. Both moves are part of a wider push by new delhi to expand its maritime footprint, Burnish its credentials as a regional security provider, and Cultivate Deeper Deeper Defense Ties with AFRRICA.
The symbolism behind these gestures is hard to miss. The aikeyme exercise and ios sagar demonstrate India’s ambition to become the “Preferred Security Partner” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). They embody not only Prime Minister Modi’s Vision for Security and Growth for all in the region (sagar) but also the recently articulated Mahasagar framework – an effort to institute to institute to Partnerships and Assert India’s Leadership in the Global South. The presence of sailors from mauritius, seychelles, kenya, mozambique, and others aboard ios sagar lends credence to the idea that Idea that India is not work
India’s moves also point to a maturing maritime strategy. At a time when Indian Ocean Dynamics are growing more complex-shaped by bot traditional security concerns and non-traditional challenges like piracy, trafficking, trafficking, and climateted displays Delhi is advancing a message of solidarity, shared awareness of maritime threats, and a willingness to offer its naval experience. Beyond Asserting Itself as a Maritime Power of Consequence, it is making a bid for influence through cooperation, sustained presence, and normative aladership.
YET, Symbolism and Strategic Return Do Not Align Neatly. Beneath This Part-Military, Part-Diplomatic Endeavor Lies a more Difability Question: To what ends is this effort directed? Is it truly about fostering African maritime capacity, or is it, in large part, shaped by India’s anxiety over China’s expena’s expanding footprint in the Western in the Western Indian Ocean? Beijing’s Naval and Commercial Presence Along Africa’s Eastern Coast Has Surged – Not only through Port Construction and Infrastructure but also Via regular Naval DeploreMENTS and JOINT REGUL DOLOIREMENTS and JOINT RESORCTURECTURE. Its peace and security ”drills with tanzania and mozambique in 2024, which involved chinese warships and marines operating along Countries are now the targets of India’s outreach.
India’s Maritime Engagement With Africa, then, is also an attempt to offer alternatives – to reassure African states that it can serve as a viable partner and a soft counterbalance to Chinese influence. Even so, the ground realities are more ambivalent. African Nations are not seeking ideological alignment or geopolitical affiliation; They are looking for Pragmatic Partnerships that Deliver Infrastructure, Investment, and Trade. In that calculus, China’s Consistency in offering tangible outstcomes containues to give it a comparative edge. India, for all its Diplomatic Finsse, does not annanial capacity or institutional architecture to match that scale of engagement.
This gap batcomes even more evident when agant India’s own strategic self-printing. The notion of India as a “first responder” or “net security provider” – frequent echoed in new delhi’s strategic discourse – is not always in how African States View Its Role. Many remain cautious of India’s Intens and Wary of Being Drawn Into Another Version of Great Power Competition. Even in Countries with Longstanding Ties, Such as Mauritius and Seychelles, Indian-Backed Infrastructure Projects Have, At Times, Provocked Political Backlash and Stirred Suspisions of Suspisions of Straits.
There is also the question of sustainability. Maritime Diplomacy is research. Deploying Ships, Hosting Joint Exercises, and Offering Training Programmes May Look Impressive On Paper, But they Demand Considerable Time, Funding, Funding, and Logistical Commitment. For a navy alredy balance operations across the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the Wider Indo-Pacific, this Western Outreach Risks Stretching Capacity. The Danger is that Such Engages Banks Ritualistic – Repeated for Continuity’s Sake Rather Than Driven by Clear Strategic Purpose.
This is not to sugges that India should pll back. On the contrary, there is genuine value in Deepening Ties with African Little States – Building Trust, Fostering Interoperability, and Helping Shape Norms for Responsible Maritime But the effort must be grown in realism, not rheteric. India cannot – and should not – seek to replicate China’s model of engine. It locations the Centralized Financing, Corporate Depth, and Infrastructure Machinery to Compete on that Terms. What it can do is partner smartly – with japan, the European Union, Gulf States, and even the us – to create cooperative frameworks that offer meaningful, if more modest, alternatives for AFRICAN Development and Maritime Security.
The More Pressing Risk is that India Might Be Mistaking Activity for Influence. Its growing visibility in African maritime affairs May satisfy domestic narrants and external optics, but visibility alone does not yield lasting strategic depth. Presence is not power unlessed by delivery, consistency, and trust. Similarly, rhetoric Around Global South Solidarity, Thought Emotionally Resonant, Must Be Matched by Tangible Agency. India’s Push for Regional Leadership Still Outpaces The Economic and Institutional Foundations Needed to Sustain It.
India’s Western Indian Ocean Diplomacy May Yet Evolve Into Something More Consequational. But for now, it remains more aspirational than strategic. Delhi Knows the Region is Getting Crowded. It should also know that presence alone won shape outcomes.
Abhijit singh is the former head of the maritime policy initiative at orf, new delhi. The views expressed are personal
