The American decision on October 22 to blacklist Russia’s energy giants Rosneft and Lukoil marks a significant escalation in economic sanctions targeted at Russia, as these two companies together account for 57% of Russia’s crude oil output and export revenue. While smaller Russian firms, responsible for the remaining 43%, remain unsanctioned by the US for now, the impact of this move is profound for major oil purchasing countries such as India. Indian oil companies have already announced that they will stop purchasing Russian oil to avoid potential sanctions. This shift is especially notable given that Russia’s share in India’s crude imports surged from a mere 1% to an all-time high of 38% following the Ukraine war. While the Donald Trump administration claimed that India was indirectly supporting Putin’s war efforts by buying Russian oil, New Delhi’s stance was simply driven by the pursuit of affordable energy. sources available at the time.
India faces a dilemma: Should it continue buying Russian oil one way or another, or cease its imports altogether? For sure, the US has no right to dictate how two sovereign nations conduct their bilateral trade. While Russian companies have been sanctioned by the US, Moscow has no intention of stopping its oil exports. It is for the importing countries, such as India and China, to decide whether they are willing to risk potential secondary sanctions from the US for doing business with the sanctioned Russian entities.
That said, India currently has two options. The first is to continue purchasing Russian oil, which will be available despite American sanctions. In doing so, Indian buyers could attempt to bypass US sanctions by sourcing oil through middlemen, avoiding direct dealings that could draw attention and attendant sanctions. India could also leverage the existing shadow fleets to bring Russian oil covertly to its refineries. While these strategies could help maintain energy supply, they also risk provoking Trump’s ire and potential sanctions.
Equally importantly, defying American sanctions, especially those imposed by a mercurial Trump may not be the smartest course of action. Pushing against Trump is akin to banging one’s head against a stone wall — it is neither effective nor prudent. Even China, which has considerably more leverage over the US than India, has so far indicated it is likely to halt purchases from the sanctioned Russian firms as well.
If picking a fight with Trump makes little sense, India would be better served by adopting a pragmatic approach to its Russian oil purchases: One that is able to balance diplomatic considerations, energy needs, and economic interests without engaging in unnecessary confrontations that could harm its broader strategic goals. That is option number two. This option relates to operating within the constraints of the Trump administration’s sanctions on Russia. In geopolitics, you play with the cards you are dealt, not with the ones you wish for, which may never be made available to you.
In a world of geopolitical pragmatism, the key criterion for India’s decision on buying Russian oil should not be whether it is done under US pressure or not, rather which of the available choices will deliver. the maximum benefit to India. A pragmatic strategy to balance US sanctions and India’s national interests would involve a series of calculated measures. Let’s consider some of them.
One, New Delhi can still buy oil from non-sanctioned Russian energy companies. Besides Rosneft and Lukoil, the two sanctioned Russian oil majors, there are still other non-sanctioned entities who India can buy oil from without attracting American secondary sanctions. It’s the two Russian firms that are sanctioned, not Russian oil per seThis is however easier said than done.
Two, viewing the issue of Russian oil in isolation would be short-sighted. India’s decision to purchase Russian oil or not must be considered in the broader context of its ability to push back against US sanctions, the likelihood of the success of such pushback, and the impact on India’s larger strategic interests vis-à-vis the US.
In other words, New Delhi must consider its broader interests vis-à-vis the US when deciding whether to abide by the American sanctions on Russia. For India, the priority is securing a favorable trade agreement with Washington and ensuring the US removes the additional 25% tariff imposed by the Trump administration for buying Russian oil. If Delhi negotiates cleverly, a trade deal could trim the 25% tariff imposed on Indian products under Trump’s first tariff decision, while ceasing Russian oil purchases might reduce to remove the additional 25% imposed later. Put differently, India should consider halting its Russian oil purchases in exchange for a favorable trade deal with the US.
New Delhi also has other medium-term interests vis-à-vis the US. While pushing back against Trump’s unilateral sanctions might surely boost our national pride, tangible benefits of national pride are generally limited, and the risks far outweigh the gains. Instead, Delhi should consider offering to stop buying sanctioned Russian oil in exchange for a shift in US policy, i.e., an end to Trump’s adverse geopolitical stance towards India in South Asia. India should seek US cooperation to restore a favorable regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring that their strategic interests are aligned in the broader regional context.
To be clear, New Delhi has limited options when it comes to defying American sanctions on Russian oil companies. So, it must make a virtue out of necessity by engaging with the Trump administration and proposing that India will comply with US sanctions in exchange for the US addressing India’s key strategic interests. Geopolitics and national interests require pragmatic, realist approaches rather than efforts to massage national egos.
Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor, Shiv Nadar University, founder-director, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
