Returning from a three-day visit to Dhaka, I am deeply struck by an unshakable sense of historical vertigo. In the streets of the Bangladeshi capital hesitantly recovering from the July 2024 “revolution”, the students are no longer in charge, the interim government has failed to make a mark, a radical Jamaat-e-Islami is riding high on a surge in its popularity, and the old order is sneaking back. The leaders of the so-called revolution have been co-opted by the status quo, and the temptations and realities of power are shaping the status quo itself.
Many of the youngsters who fueled the 2024 uprising feel the fundamental features of the old status quo remain untouched. For many of them, this was a “wasted revolution” that toppled a regime, but failed to change the anatomy of the old order — marked by class relations, lack of civic facilities, the corrupt bureaucracy and the police and so on. But for those of us analyzing Bangladesh from afar, there are several new realities in the country to reckon with.
As the country approaches the general elections — scheduled for early February — the central question for New Delhi is no longer about “who will win”, but how India’s grand strategy must evolve to meet a neighbor that is reimagining itself; Dhaka’s domestic political trajectory and relationship with India which are, in a sense, shaping each other. For decades, Indian policy toward Bangladesh was anchored in a comfortable, but narrow, partnership with the Awami League, which today has become a liability for Delhi. The ouster of Sheikh Hasina shattered that framework and left South Bloc to navigate a new political landscape where its trusted partner evokes almost universal disapproval, and its traditional detractors are the new frontrunners to rule Dhaka.
My conversations in Dhaka tell me that while the country’s domestic politics is fraught with uncertainty, the situation offers a rare opening for India to move from a regime-centric approach to Dhaka to a State-centric grand strategy. The most notable shift is the unmissable metamorphosis of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Long considered in the Indian strategic circles as an anti-India political formation, the BNP is not only the clear favorite in this election, buoyed by the dramatic disappearance of the student unity during the July uprising, the discrediting of the Awami League, Tarique Rahman’s return to Bangladesh, and his mother Khaleda Zia’s passing, but is also shedding its anti-India image. Domestically, however, the party today finds itself in a curious predicament. In the post-“revolutionary” atmosphere, the party is increasingly viewed by the youth as the new establishment — the status quo party that might simply replicate the old order with new people. For many youngsters in Dhaka’s streets, the BNP’s return to power is nothing but a continuation of the old guard they revolted against.
But for India, the BNP’s pivot to the center is an opportunity. The recent meeting in Dhaka between external affairs minister S Jaishankar and BNP chief Tarique Rahman marks a definitive break with the past, those present at the meeting recalled. The BNP of 2026 is positively poised to work with India, driven by the realization that governing the country requires a stable and healthy economic relationship with New Delhi. If the BNP is the new establishment in Dhaka, and is willing to more or less assume the role of the old establishment, Delhi must grab the opportunity. It should not matter for New Delhi who the actors in Dhaka are, but what the outcomes for India will be.
Equally striking is the ascent of the Jamaat-e-Islami, currently enjoying its highest level of political support in history. Benefiting from a popular perception for being not corrupt compared to the traditional political behemoths, Jamaat is no longer a fringe element untouchable by mainstream political parties, especially considering that a significant chunk of the erstwhile “revolutionary” leadership is in an electoral coalition with the radical Islamic grouping.
And yet, I suspect that even Jamaat is proving to be a pragmatic actor. The closer they come to power, the more their policy outlook is likely to soften even if the rhetoric remains anti-India until they have to engage with India. So, if New Delhi reaches out, the Jamaat may respond to having a working relationship. A strategy that accounts for a pragmatic Jamaat we can do business with is not a concession to an ideological foe; it is a recognition of a political reality in a difficult region.
To engage the post-“revolutionary” Bangladesh, India’s grand strategy must now follow three critical steps.
First, we must decouple our interests from specific political dynasties in Dhaka for the simple reason that in contemporary Bangladesh and going forward, the default impulse of any establishment would be to proactively engage New Delhi. We should welcome a scenario where not being anti-India is a structural necessity for any party in power in Dhaka.
Second, we must look past the campaign rhetoric in Bangladesh. In the lead-up to February, nationalist barbs and anti-India slogans are inevitable especially in a country that is still recovering from a violent uprising that overthrown a deeply unpopular regime closely linked to India. New Delhi must maintain prudence and patience, focusing on quiet, substantive engagements, rather than public noise either on our side or theirs. Once the elections are over, the rhetoric will inevitably subside. That’s when to make the diplomatic move.
Third, India must actively support the institutional stabilization of Bangladesh. Whether it is through continued infrastructure credit lines or energy partnerships, India must be seen as a partner to the Bangladeshi people and their aspirations for a reformed status quo. There is an urgent need to change the narrative, and positive actions are great narrative setters.
If New Delhi can navigate the political shift in Dhaka focusing on its national interests, avoiding ideological baggage, political binaries, and past grievances, it can transform the anti-India mood in Bangladesh. The goal is to ensure that no matter who wins in February, Dhaka stays a key node in New Delhi’s subcontinental strategy.
Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor, School of Humanities & Social Sciences, Shiv Nadar University, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD. The views expressed are personal
