On September 17, The Us Announced the End of the Sanctions Waver related to Iran’s Chabahar Port. The waver – in place since 2018 when president Donald Trump (in his first term) unilaterally withdrew from the ran nuclear deal and launched a “Maximum pressure” maximum pressure Delhi to develop and operate the port. In his second presidential term, trump resume his coercive diplomacy with ran.
In February 2025, when he asked for a review of the waevers, India Faced Tough choices. Having Signed A 10-Year Bilateral Contract With Iran in May 2024 to Develop and Operate the port, India focused on Using Meanwhile, new Delhi also Viewed Its Partnerships With the Us, The EU, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in the India-Middle East-Economic Corridor (IMEC) as Crucial to Countter Chaina ‘ Influence in West Asia. Since then, West Asia’s Geopolitical Landscape has Seen Radical Shifts and Realignments. India must refresh its strategy for the region.
During the 12-day israel -ran war, triggered by israel’s surprise at Iran’s strategic sites, the gulf states found themselves causedfire. Iran retaliated against the us bombing of Iranian Nuclear Facilites with Missile Strikes – Thought Symbolic – on al -udeid air base in quatar. Israel’s War Against The Iran-Backed “Axis of Resistance” has reduced ran’s level as a threat in the region to a point where saudi arabia arabia no longer feel Israel. Also, israel’s unrestrained warfare and its bid to become an unchalled Military power in the region has alarmed the gulf states. Israel’s Air Strike on the Hamas Leadership in Qatar Highlighted The Limitations of Us Security Guarantees as a deterrent. Saudi Arabia’s Signing of a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan – which has no Diplomatic Relations With Israel – Has Ended Hopes of a geopolitical align amia, israel, Saudi Arabia, And the uae as the key us partners and allies.
Since the Pakistan-Sponsored Terror Attack in Pahalgam and the ENSUIN MILITARY CONFLICT BETWEEN India and Pakistan, Islamabad has sourthen ties with strenchthen ties with tehran throwing two-new Visits. Given Iran’s Postwar Security Calculus Involves Deepening Dialogue With NeighBors, it is unlikely to be alarmed by the saudi-pakistan defense paste. Iran’s longstanding position has been to support region-line security arranges, while oppose the us-LED Security Architecture. Under Its Look East Strategy, Tehran has also downplayed the importance of chabahar port as a geopolitical investment involving India. At the Recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in China, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian Noted that Chabahar will only be linked with irran’s Railway Network, Creating A Vital Corridor LINKING SINKINL Asia, and Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. Tehran has also Sought Cross-Border Railway Linkages and Shipping Routes Between Chabahar and Gwadar in Pakistan.
India has shown significant resilience in developing chabahar port. Earlier this month, on the sidelines of India -ran Foreign Office Consultations in Tehran, The two Countries Held Trilateral Meetings with Armenia and Uzbekistan. A key discussion point was the use of chabahar port to expand trade. As India AIMS to Deepen its strategic and commercial engine with the gulf and central asia, it must demonstrate an independent posture and the ability to buy long-term partnerships.
Deepika Saraswat is an Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses.The Views Expressed Are Personal
