For the first time since the Taliban assumed power in Kabul in August 2021, India has hosted the Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in New Delhi. New Delhi’s policy has so far been a slow but steady engagement of the Taliban, but without recognizing the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, apart from the Russian federation, which recognized the Taliban government a few months ago, no other country has done so thus far.
India has been engaging the Taliban before and after it came to power in Kabul four years ago, and the visit of Muttaqi to India with India officially referring to him as the “foreign minister of Afghanistan” is the The closest it has come to recognizing the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. If New Delhi is prepared to treat Muttaqi as the foreign minister of Afghanistan, and call him as such, why not recognize the government he represents as the official government of Afghanistan?
The time has come for New Delhi to recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan, for the simple reason that doing so has minimal downsides and clear strategic benefits. I will highlight four specific reasons why New Delhi should consider recognizing the Taliban government without delay. But before I come to that, let us briefly discuss some of the objections to doing so.
The most strident objection to extending diplomatic recognition to the Taliban in Afghanistan stems from a moral argument. India should not recognize a regime that espouses deeply undesirable values and adopts discriminatory practices against half or more of its citizens, goes the argument. There is merit here. Having acknowledged that, it must be kept in mind that neither are all regimes morally acceptable (just because they commit atrocities in a sophisticated manner) nor does recognizing a regime with Unacceptable moral values amounts to endorsing its values or lack thereof. International politics is more complex than that. Our personal choices of friendship can’t determine how States make policy choices.
The second objection is that by recognizing the Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan, one may be unwittingly enabling the rise of puritanism and strengthening abhorrent values in the region. I think the exact opposite is true. Mainstreaming the Taliban by recognizing them is a way to socialize them into better behaviour. Consider this. The Taliban of 1996 is not the Taliban of 2025. They have become worldly wise, slightly more moderate, and more open to modern ways of dealing with the world around them. After intense criticism for gender-based discrimination, the Taliban corrected their mistake by inviting Indian women journalists — who were excluded from Friday’s Delhi press conference — to the one yesterday. Sometimes, change stems from exposure, socialization, and pressure rather than outright exclusion. Even if you disagree with that, shunning a regime in your neighborhood because you don’t agree with their beliefs and practices is bad statecraft.
The third objection concerns how courting the Taliban could worsen relations between India and Pakistan, potentially pulling India into Afghanistan’s ongoing conflicts. However, the reality is that India-Pakistan relations are already at a low point, and engaging with Afghanistan is unlikely to significantly alter that dynamic.
Let me now outline four reasons why India must recognize the Taliban government. First of all, the Taliban have generally maintained a positive stance towards India, apart from the IC814 hijack, which was more the handiwork of the Pakistani ISI than the Taliban itself. Since taking power in Kabul in August 2021, they have made efforts to improve relations with India, including emphasizing that Kashmir is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, thereby aligning with India’s own position on the issue.
Second, only Russia has so far recognized the Taliban government in Kabul, but it’s only a matter of time before other countries follow, given the reduced Western pressure on the Taliban and the decline in the local resistance to it. China and Pakistan are likely to follow Russia’s example. If New Delhi waits to recognize the Taliban after other countries have done so, it would diminish the diplomatic importance of such a move. Conversely, early recognition would give India a strategic first-mover advantage, positioning itself as a key player in shaping the future of Afghanistan. The argument that India shouldn’t recognize the Taliban because others haven’t is flawed; in fact, it is precisely because others haven’t done this that India must take the opportunity to recognize them.
Third, maintaining a close strategic partnership with Taliban-led Afghanistan may even be a useful strategy in dealing with the Sino-Pakistan plans to wean the region away from India, and to balance, to the extent possible, the growing Chinese closeness to Kabul. No matter who rules Kabul, Afghanistan has, for the most part, been an important partner to India. The presence of an disagreeable regime in Kabul should not disrupt that important partnership.
India’s “full commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Afghanistan,” as stated by external affairs minister S Jaishankar during Muttaqi’s visit, appears primarily aimed at Pakistan. This suggests that New Delhi recognizes the strategic value of proactively engaging with Afghanistan’s government as a way to counterbalance Pakistan’s influence in the region. There is no point in beating around the bush on that.
Courting the Taliban regime has a useful Pakistan angle to it.
Finally, for the Taliban, which is desperately seeking international recognition and legitimacy, diplomatic recognition from India would be highly significant. For India, it could help cultivate a strong foundation of political goodwill in Kabul, and foster a strategic partnership with Afghanistan. In an increasingly unfriendly regional environment, New Delhi stands to gain valuable goodwill, strategic partnerships, and a friendly presence at the gates of Central Asia by taking this step.
Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor of Shiv Nadar University, the founder-director of Council for Strategic and Defense Research, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
