If you ask an Indian whether he/she wants to go to the US/Europe or to Russia for studies, tourism, or even to settle down, the answer is not hard to guess: It won’t be Russia. If you ask any Indian strategic thinker whether in the longer run the strategic partnership with Russia is more consequential than that with the US, the considered answer is likely to be “no”. Even within the government, I suppose the thinking would be that Russia is an important strategic partner but not as consequential as the US (militarily) or Europeans (economically) over a longer horizon.
And yet, Indians in general have a perplexingly positive attitude toward Russia, a country they are unlikely to visit as tourists, workers, students, migrants, or engage with for trade. It is as if Russia has left an indelible mark on India’s strategic and popular consciousness. What explains this?
There are, to my mind, four reasons for this. The first reason, of course, is history. Indians continue to gratefully remember Russia as having stood by India in 1971, and as a steady defense supplier thereafter. Even prior to Independence — when India was still colonized by the UK, and the US or other western countries did nothing about it — there was far more support from the erstwhile USSR for the anti-colonial struggle.
Second, India’s positive view of Russia is also attitudinal. In contrast to the abiding feeling in New Delhi that the US or the West miss no opportunity to castigate or publicly shame India for its shortcomings, countries such as Russia are seen as sensitive to India’s challenges. Moscow is also seen having provided political and “emotional” support when New Delhi was at the receiving end of the US and western ire for testing nuclear devices. For the postcolonial Indian political class, respect matters a great deal, something a lot of India’s interlocutors fail to grasp. That is why, I think, the subtitle of the Joint Statement from the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit on December 5, 2025, is instructive: “A Time-Tested Progressive Partnership, Anchored in Trust & Mutual Respect.”
Third, Russia has been responsive to India’s defense needs, providing crucial equipment and being open to defense co-production, as seen with BrahMos. Russia has also shared advanced systems, such as the S-400, which is vital for India’s air defence. More so, Russian military systems typically come with minimal political conditionalities. Finally, there is a general belief in India (factual or not) that the US is a “fair-weather friend”; but Russia is someone who shows up in a crisis.
However, it is undeniable that systemic difficulties have crept into the India-Russia relationship. Defense procurement is on the decline, with no major defense deals announced during Putin’s recent visit, contrary to expectations. Discussions about energy trade largely remain future-oriented, as India has significantly reduced its energy purchases from Russian companies. Furthermore, Russia’s close partnership with China has generated unease in New Delhi.
The joint statement emphasizes cultural cooperation, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges between India and Russia. While these goals sound good, one is not sure if there is significant interest in either country for such exchanges. Wealthy Indians tend to prefer traveling to the West or the US over Russia, and Russians may not prioritize visiting India.
There is also a renewed desire to increase trade relations between India and Russia with a declared aim of achieving a bilateral trade target of $100 billion by 2030. While India must increase its trade with Russia, this can only happen if the American and western sanctions against Russia are lifted. Without the removal of these sanctions, India’s ability to ramp up trade with Russia will remain constrained due to payment and banking challenges. The agreement mentions that the two sides “have agreed to continue their consultations on enabling the interoperability of the national payment systems, financial messaging systems, as well as central bank digital currency platforms”. If Trump is able to end the Russia-Ukraine war through some grand bargain and decides to accommodate Russia into the global order, it would be easier for New Delhi to work and trade with Moscow, but trade using alternative payment systems and financial messaging systems is easier said than done.
The agreement touches upon concrete issues such as bilateral interaction within the G20, Brics, and SCO, long-term supply of Russian fertilizers to India, and the potential establishment of joint ventures in this sector. It also includes agreements on the mobility of skilled workers from India to Russia, which is crucial for Russia in light of its demographic decline. Building on Putin’s last visit to Delhi in December 2021, there were discussions about a joint approach to Afghanistan.
While these are significant issues, substantial effort will be needed for their implementation.
The joint statement lacks clarity on whether India and Russia discussed major geopolitical concerns, such as the growing Sino-Russian relations. Despite the impressive optics surrounding Putin’s visit to Delhi, the focus was more on optics than substance.
For the India-Russia relationship to remain strong, Moscow must reassure New Delhi regarding the China issue, while India should offer some assurances to Russia about its ties with the US and the West. Russia’s growing strategic partnership with China has direct implications for India, whereas India’s ties with the US and the West do not affect Russia, as evidenced by India’s stance during the Ukraine war. So, the ball is in Russia’s court to reassure India on China.
Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor of Shiv Nadar University, the founder-director of Council for Strategic and Defense Research, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
