Every era has its own world order, with its own characteristics, which change with the flow of history. The order of the post-World War II era is unique in forging for the first time a global architecture of institutions, mechanisms, laws, agreed principles and norms, largely fashioned and led by a homogenous West under US leadership. That order was flawed and disorderly, subject to exceptionalism and multiple breaches, but was held together by the illusion of its sanctity.
US military interventions and regime change are not new. Democrats and Republicans alike have done it. The genius of the American-led system was that it enabled the US to pursue self-interest masked as delivering international public goods. The difference with President Donald Trump’s Venezuelan raid or statements on Greenland is that the pretense is no longer there.
Trump’s personality may be an aberration, but his policies are a high point, if not a culmination, of a US trend in the making for some time. The US is abandoning the international system it created because it no longer finds it useful. It sees the international framework as fetters on its power and the unilateral application of power as the way to advance its interests. As US economic dominance slips and its self-confidence erodes, reliance on its unmatched military force is higher. The absence of Cold War checks makes it easier. After the Venezuelan intoxicant, Trump will want more. But, resistance chooses its own form and time. Shredding alliance trust, shared economic stakes, and soft power will shrink overall US influence and power. The forces unleashed in the US will last beyond Trump.
The transatlantic relationship, including NATO, was a US Cold War need. For long, it lingered in search of causes to rekindle the bonds. Trump has untethered a long-adrift relationship. Europe, now buffeted by three major powers, stares at strategic irrelevance, besides a relative decline in competitiveness and innovation. It must now build a future on its many strengths, independent of the US. The Ukraine war may have weakened Russia, but it has not dented its will or its capacity to shape its own security sphere.
China may not need the inspiration of Venezuela or Ukraine to achieve its now unambiguous goal of reunifying Taiwan within a finite time-frame. China’s territorial ambitions and appropriations precede the two wars. Its timing and method will follow its own calculations and strategic culture. Currently, its accumulation of power co-exists with internal challenges and external vulnerabilities. At any rate, China will have no interest in a world order that does not suit its new major power status. Nor is it certain that China’s exercise of global power would emulate US goals or methods.
The post-War order is behind us because its creators no longer need it, and the once-excluded new powers have no love for it. We are in a transition with the debris of a broken system, in the uncertainty that follows the end of anything. The moment resembles the past — power over norms, heightened territorial ambitions, weaponisation of trade policies, democratic recession, resource scramble, racism, religious conflict and so on. How we see the future order depends on our time-frame. More than the debate on a bipolar or a multipolar world, or the likely winner of great power competition, it is more important to focus on the forces shaping the world.
Technology is a determinant of economic, military and political power. That, in turn, shapes the dominance of values. The onset of the AI age will have implications at five levels — personal, societal or national, economic, national security and geopolitics. Global economic shifts, disappearance of jobs and unequal access and capacity in new technologies, including AI, will widen inequality within and between nations. The politics of populism and identity will thrive. As Gen Z protests show, generational shifts in thought and methods will be quicker and sharper. Social consensus will be increasingly fragile. Democratic institutions will be under pressure because of delivery gaps and inability to cope with social media storms. Economic and social doctrines of the Reagan-Thatcher era are changing.
Internal choices are shaping external outlook. Globalism is giving way to protectionism, universalism to nationalism, and liberalism to illiberalism. The scaffolds of globalism, from institutions and laws to free trade, are coming apart. Major powers will test each other and seek to bend the world to their will. Middle powers will need each other more. Others will search for countervailing checks without the refuge of multilateralism. Alliances will fracture, new equations form and groupings and forums will grow. Global fragmentation will grow at multiple levels. Trade is fragmenting through weaponisation, alignment with geopolitics, increasing restrictions and, shift from multilateralism to regionalism and bilateralism. Finance increasingly flows along geopolitical lines, especially in the industries of the future. US dollar-denominated reserves are declining. Russia is excluded from the Western financial system. China will reduce its exposure to it. The politicization of SWIFT and CHIPS will accelerate the emergence of alternative payment channels. Tokenisation will aid the process.
The Internet could fragment, too. Sovereignty and security concerns will lead countries to build controls for data, cloud, AI, applications, cybersecurity and even communication and social media platforms. Techno-nationalism and technology competition could lead to alternative technologies and standards. Energy trade is being reshaped by geopolitics. Further, countries will seek energy security by replacing imported fossil energy with renewable and nuclear energy.
Security will see new technologies, domains and warfare methods. Society, space, maritime, cyber, underwater and seabed will be both instruments and theaters of conflicts. As electronics gave the US overwhelming military superiority, new technologies and dominance over new domains will enhance the asymmetry between major powers and the rest. Worse, the comfort that those with nuclear weapons will be rational is diminished. This will spur conventional military buildup and the pursuit of nuclear capabilities in many countries.
The greatest challenge will be to avoid extrapolating past assumptions and choices into the future. Now, focusing on the drivers of the future matters as much, if not more, than simply managing relationships. Disruptions inevitably extract short term costs. For India, preparing for the future order — and help shape it — will require, first, rapid accretion to domestic capacities and social cohesion that impart strength and resilience, as also reframing traditional relationships and diversifying partnerships to mitigate risks and build influence.
Jawed Ashraf, a former ambassador, is chairman, India Trade Promotion Organization (ITPO). The views expressed are personal
