The US’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2025 has attracted intense scrutiny, given the US’s effort to ensure its primacy in a global order drifting towards multi-polarity. It emphasizes the America First approach visible in all of the Trump administration’s moves and statements in the arena of geopolitics, including the military operation in Venezuela and the US President’s latest assertions on Greenland despite its post-World War II ally, Europe, being resolute in its opposition to this. Underlining Trumpian exasperation that the global order no longer serves core US interests, NSS 2025 reveals a clear tilt toward Westphalian principles — State sovereignty, territorial integrity, and military primacy — while sidelining post-Westphalian norms such as universal human rights, conditional sovereignty, binding treaties, and the primacy of the people over State interests. In practice, the US continues to use human rights and norms instrumentally, but humanitarian interventions are no longer treated as moral obligations. This “flexible realism” recommends stable relations with States whose governance differs from the US’s, notably Russia and China.
The NSS frames US survival and power as of paramount importance. Maintaining the “world’s most powerful, lethal and technologically advanced military” is a central theme, including robust nuclear deterrence and next-generation missile defenses. Economic nationalism undergirds the call for military strength, with a focus on restoring domestic industrial capacity, particularly in sectors critical to global power, such as shipbuilding, Artificial Intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing. Soft power remains important but is now tied explicitly to American interests, constrained in part by China’s global influence. The strategy prompts one to look at interesting parallels in leadership projection between China and the US. China’s President, Xi Jinping, has long been presented in official documents as central to achieving the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation. Now, the NSS portrays Trump in hagiographic terms as a “President of Peace”, capable of providing messianic solutions — notwithstanding the president’s recent disavowal of peace (linked to the Nobel committee refusing him the Peace prize) as a driving concern for Trump’s White House. This framework is an ideologically-agnostic affirmation of a strong, centralized leadership driving national objectives.
Iran — on the boil at present over economic stress and the Ayatollah regime’s hardline social governance approach — has been labeled West Asia’s “chief destabilizing force”, though its overall threat potential has diminished compared to that outlined in NSS 2017, following Trump’s Operation Midnight Hammer of June 2025. Allies aren’t spared either — NSS 2025 critiques Europe’s “lack of self-confidence” and warns against free-riding in alliances. NATO is viewed through a transactional lens. While Article 5 commitments remain, it is clear that the US largely controls the activation of collective security. Allies are urged to meet the milestone Hague Commitment of spending 5% of GDP on defense spearheaded by Trump. Germany is singled out for its external dependencies, particularly its chemical companies that are building large processing plants in China using Russian gas unavailable at home. (Such observations implicitly expose the hypocrisy inherent in Europe’s past criticism of India’s energy deals with Russia.) The NSS also signals a shift from earlier expansions of NATO, emphasizing that it should not be perceived, or become, a perpetually expanding alliance, a point likely to be reassuring to Moscow.
With threats to Greenland’s sovereignty, Trump seems to no longer be inclined to engage Europe as an ally, if not painting it to be an adversary.
In NSS 2025, Taiwan remains a priority, with deterrence the preferred option. Military overmatch vis-à-vis the threat — in this case, China — is seen as serving as a fallback in line with obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, if deterrence fails. The NSS stresses freedom of navigation and maintaining US presence in the Western Pacific, besides linking the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea to core US economic and security interests.
The NSS declares that “the era of mass migration is over,” distinguishing between controlled legal migration of talent and unregulated migration, the latter framed as a national security threat linked to terrorism, drugs, espionage, and human trafficking. Human rights considerations are rendered secondary to national priorities. Economic nationalism and technological leadership are also juxtaposed, with clear warnings to allies, partners, and competitors about fairness.
NSS 2025 reinforces the “primacy of nations” and the survival imperative of the US as a sovereign republic. Military strength, alliances, and technological superiority remain central, while post-Westphalian norms, including collective security, humanitarian intervention, and supranational influence, are to be applied instrumentally at best. Relations with global powers are transactional; the US continues to engage, but outcomes are primarily measured against American economic and security interests.
Although some observers interpret NSS 2025 as downplaying India’s importance, the strategy explicitly identifies India as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific and a participant in the Quad framework. The NSS calls for improving commercial relations and security cooperation with India. The limited number of references reflects a more transactional tone, emphasizing practical aspects over ideological alignment. India’s global emergence though remains undeniable, quite independent of the frequency of mention in NSS documents.
NSS 2025, in sum, reflects a return to classical Westphalian realpolitik, with state survival, military power, and economic strength prioritized over moral or ideological considerations. While it retains rhetorical support for human rights and alliances, the thrust is on increasingly leveraging these for strategic gain rather than treating them as moral imperatives. Leadership projection suggests parallels with China, emphasizing centralized, decisive authority. NSS 2025 reflects adaptation to a world in which China and other powers are increasingly assertive. Washington’s aggressive tone on Greenland is an instance of the NSS 2025 vision coming into play.
Sujan R Chinoy is director general, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal
