Sonam Wangchuk’s continued detention since September 26, 2025, is a matter of serious concern. The trajectory of the habeas corpus The case filed by his wife, Gitanjali Angmo, before the Supreme Court poses several significant questions that reveal the nature of the legal process in India, touching on personal liberty. The inadequacy of resorting to conventional legal tools alone while criticizing such juridical events leads to an incomplete understanding of the process. A discourse over the text of the judgments or orders, separating it from their political context, turns deceptive, as it assumes that legal processes are intrinsically neutral and unconnected with the contemporality of politics.
The recent announcement of the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima v. State which denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, while granting it to five other petitioners, is a case in point that could be compared and contrasted. Many courses adopted by the top court in these cases, both in theory and in practice, remain antithetical to the traditional understanding of the principles of law and their working. This deviation would call for a discourse on the court’s adjudicative behavior during critical times, rather than on the mere content of the judgments.
Khalid and Imam were arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the provisions of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code and other statutes. They sought bail after incarceration for about five-and-a-half years. In the case of Wangchuk, by asking for a writ of habeas corpus Under Article 32 of the Constitution, his wife demanded the release of the renowned climate activist. Beyond the glaring distinctions in the legal processes and technicalities, certain commonalities exist in these cases. In both cases, there has been a fragile narrative about the alleged complicity of the activists who dared to challenge the regime at the Centre. In both, the court’s role resulted not in ensuring individual liberty, but only in prolonging incarceration. The very process that was supposed to expedite the release of the petitioners resulted in delaying it or even denying it.
In the Khalid-Imam bail judgment, the court’s expansive interpretation of section 15 of the UAPA, defining a terrorist act, ultimately meant that even a roadblock amid the protest against the Centre’s divisive policies would amount to an act of terrorism. The two-judge bench in Gulfisha Fatimaessentially overruled the three-judge bench judgment in Union of India v. KA Najeeb (2021), which said that long incarceration and the resultant violation of fundamental rights could be a ground to grant bail even under UAPA. The two-judge bench did not even refer to the earlier decision in Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) that said that the prosecution cannot even oppose the bail plea when the trial is prolonged.
More astonishingly, the court has, in Gulfisha Fatimapractically prohibited Khalid and Imam from filing a fresh application for bail for another year. This judicial moratorium happened in the appeals that they filed. An outcome which the appellants in a criminal appeal neither sought nor expected is patently unfair. This is particularly so when the Supreme Court has repeatedly underlined the right of the accused to file repeated bail pleas when there are changes in the circumstances. (See, for example, Parvinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) and Kamal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025).
The trajectory of the Sonam Wangchuk case also exposes a series of improbabilities. Despite the petitioner showing the court that Wangchuk’s detention was legally vitiated, the Center could postpone the adjudication of the habeas corpus writ, thereby meaning that Wangchuk’s detention continued for more than 120 days. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court immediately after his arrest. The habeas corpus The petition is intended for the quick production and release of the detainee. The grounds of challenge included non-supply of the videos to Wangchuk, based on which the authority resorted to his “preventive detention”. Clear violation of Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution, mandating intimation about the grounds of arrest with full particulars and the videos was pointed out. An opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention based on such intimation was pleaded. It was shown that many materials relied on by the authorities included first information reports against unknown persons and other outdated documents. It was contended that the district magistrate, while ordering his detention, did not issue any independent order reflecting the application of mind. Pertinently, a video of Wangchuk’s speech calling for peace was played in court.
Despite the apparent clarity in the contentions for release of the climate activist whose track record and social commitment are demonstrated in the public domain, the Supreme Court has been indecisive so far and has generously granted adjournments to the Centre. Even an adjudication on the points indicated above, and other related issues, would need only a few days, if not hours. Yet, the process took an incredibly long route.
In Anatomy of the State (1974), the liberal thinker Murray Rothbard lamented that “of all the numerous forms that governments have taken over the centuries, of all the concepts and institutions that have been tried, none has succeeded in keeping the State in check”. Rothbard talks about the coercive, parasitic, and predatory nature of the State that takes in the legal system within its structure. In The Politics of the Judiciary (1977), JAG Griffith questioned the idea of judicial neutrality. Constitutions and the judiciary across the globe have tried to overcome this pessimism of the 1970s, but without success when it comes to political prisoners. The global crisis of democracy manifests through the process of law as well, which ironically negates the very idea of the rule of law. Like certain draconian statutes, judicial processes also create a chilling effect on the citizens’ freedom.
Kaleeswaram Raj is a lawyer at the Supreme Court of India. The views expressed are personal
